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THE YOUNG AND THE 
REDEMPTIONLESS? JUVENILE 




The Supreme Court’s decision on Montgomery was still pending at 
the time of writing. On Monday, January 25th, the Court issued its 
decision, holding that Miller’s prohibition on mandatory life without 
parole for juveniles announced a new substantive rule that is 
retroactive in cases on state collateral review.  The Court largely 
articulated the reasoning in the Commentary below, stressing that 
Miller rendered life without parole an unconstitutional punishment 
for juvenile offenders whose crimes did not reflect irrevocable 
depravity.  Such rules prohibiting certain punishments for certain 
classes of defendants are hallmark substantive rules, which must apply 
retroactively under Supreme Court precedent. The Court’s decision 
departs somewhat from the Commentary below in its discussion of 
remedies. While my Commentary contemplates resentencing as an the 
sole appropriate remedy for adults who were sentenced as youths to 
life without parole, the Court held that a state may remedy a Miller 
violation by extending parole eligibility to those offenders. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment protects defendants from excessive sanctions.1 Although 
this protection has long stood as central to American jurisprudence, 
our understanding of what constitutes cruel and unusual is far from 
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‘11,  Co-Founder and Co-Director at the Youth Sentencing & Reentry Project and former 
member of the Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy, for her invaluable 
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 1.  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005). 
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static. Rather, it is dynamic and tracks “the evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”2 In recent 
years, the Supreme Court has analyzed the Eighth Amendment in the 
context of juvenile criminal law. The Court has recognized that 
children, much like our “maturing society,” possess capacity for 
growth and change.3 Generally speaking, the relative cognitive and 
emotional immaturity of children makes juvenile offenders less 
culpable for their actions than their adult counterparts. Children are 
thus more likely to rehabilitate and desist from unlawful behavior as 
they age.4 
Our contemporary understanding of juvenile offenders is radically 
different from that of the 1970s.5 Prompted by fear of escalating 
juvenile crime rates and media reports of juvenile “super predators,” 
state legislatures passed laws that substantially increased the number 
of youth tried as adults.6 Consequently, more children received “adult” 
sentences, such as life imprisonment without parole and the death 
penalty, which stood clearly in opposition to the juvenile system’s 
emphasis on rehabilitation.7 
In the new millennium, the Court began to realize that “adult time 
for adult crime”8 was a persuasive mantra, but an unconstitutional 
approach to juvenile punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Thus, 
in 2005, the Court in Roper v. Simmons banned capital punishment for 
children.9 Five years later, the Court invalidated life without parole 
(LWOP) sentences for non-homicide juvenile offenses in Graham v. 
Florida.10 Most recently, in Miller v. Alabama, the court held that 
mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles constitute cruel and 
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.11 
Few would dispute that these three decisions reflect a dramatically 
different understanding of juvenile sentencing from that of earlier 
decades. Courts across the country, however, disagree sharply about 
 
 2.  Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
 3.  See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569. 
 4.  See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
 5.  See Vincent M. Southerland, Youth Matters: The Need To Treat Children Like 
Children, 27 J. CIV. RTS. & ECON. DEV. 765, 766 (2015). 
 6.  Id. at 766. 
 7.  Id. at 779. 
 8.  See Martin Guggenheim, Graham v. Florida and a Juvenile’s Right to Age-Appropriate 
Sentencing, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 457 at 473 (2012). 
 9.  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 10.  560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
 11.  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
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whether the holding in Miller applies retroactively on collateral 
review.12 Many state and federal courts have held that the Court in 
Miller fashioned a substantive rule, which must apply on collateral 
review to individuals who were sentenced pre-Miller to mandatory 
LWOP for crimes they committed as juveniles.13 As a result, these 
individuals are now entitled to new sentencing hearings, in which 
courts will take the mitigating factors of youth into account.14 Other 
courts, however, treat Miller’s ban on mandatory LWOP for youths as 
simply a new procedural rule, not a substantive one.15 Consequently, 
individuals in these jurisdictions who received mandatory LWOP 
sentences before Miller are not entitled to the benefit of new 
sentencing hearings, even though they are now effectively serving 
illegal sentences.16 
The Louisiana Supreme Court adopted the latter view in 
Montgomery v. Louisiana, holding that Miller does not apply 
retroactively on collateral review to people sentenced to mandatory 
LWOP as juveniles.17 Following Miller, Henry Montgomery petitioned 
the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari in September of 2014.18 The 
Court granted certiorari in March of 2015.19 The State of Louisiana is 
the respondent. 
This commentary begins by detailing the relevant factual 
background of Montgomery, including the contemporaneous 
development of Supreme Court jurisprudence about juvenile 
sentencing. It proceeds by detailing the procedural history of 
Louisiana v. Miller as well as the Supreme Court of Louisiana’s 
holding in the case below. It then examines the arguments advanced 
 
 12.  Collateral review is a non-appeal proceeding to attack a judgment. A petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus is one type of collateral attack. See Collateral Review, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 13.  See Brief in Opposition at 14, Montgomery v. Louisiana, No. 14-280 (U.S. Dec. 1, 
2014) (listing federal courts in New York, California, New Jersey, and Minnesota and state 
courts in Florida, California, Iowa, Illinois, Nebraska, Mississippi, Texas, and Wyoming as 
applying Miller retroactively). 
 14.  See id. 
 15.  See id. (describing state courts in Alabama, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, 
and Pennsylvania as not applying retroactively, as well as the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits). 
 16.  See id. 
 17.  See State v. Montgomery, 2013-1163 (La. 06/20/14), 141 So. 3d 264. 
 18.  See Brief for Petitioner at 9, Montgomery v. Louisiana, No. 14-280 (U.S. June 22, 2015) 
[hereinafter Brief for Petitioner]. 
 19.  The Court granted Montgomery’s petition after Toca v. Louisiana, the case the Court 
had initially agreed to review in order to resolve Miller’s retroactivity issue, became moot 
because of an actual innocence issue. 
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by both parties, concluding that the Court should reverse the 
Louisiana decision and resolve the existing split among state and 
federal courts by holding that Miller applies retroactively.20 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In 1963, Henry Montgomery, an African-American teenager, was 
arrested for the murder of a white law enforcement officer in 
Louisiana.21 Following a jury trial in Baton Rouge, a city permeated 
by KKK activity, Montgomery was convicted of murder and 
sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment without parole.22 As a 
result, under Louisiana law, Montgomery would never have the 
opportunity to alter or reduce his sentence by demonstrating 
rehabilitated character during a parole hearing.23 
The Supreme Court recently recognized that the sentence 
Montgomery received is unconstitutional under the Eighth 
Amendment.24 In Miller v. Alabama, the Court held that imposing 
mandatory LWOP sentences on juveniles constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment.25 Sentencers must have the ability to consider 
“the mitigating qualities of youth,” which a mandatory LWOP 
sentence precludes by automatically and irrevocably requiring an 
individual to die in prison, regardless of that individual’s level of 
culpability and capacity for rehabilitation.26 
Although Miller rendered Montgomery’s sentence unlawful, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court denied his motion to correct an illegal 
sentence.27 The court declared that Miller created a new procedural 
rule, not a new substantive rule.28 Under the Supreme Court’s analysis 
in the 1989 decision Teague v. Lane,29 only new substantive rules apply 
retroactively. If a new rule is merely procedural, it will not apply 
retroactively on collateral review.30 Even though the continued 
 
 20.  The Court will also determine whether it has jurisdiction to decide this case, but this 
commentary will only focus on the retroactivity issue. 
 21.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at 3. 
 22.  See id. at 3–5. 
 23.  See id. at 5–8. 
 24.  See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012). 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. at 2459. 
 27.  See State v. Montgomery, 2013-1163 (La. 06/20/14), 141 So. 3d 264. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  489 U.S. 288, 109 (1989). 
 30.  See id. 
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implementation of Miller’s sentence constitutes ongoing cruel and 
unusual punishment, the Supreme Court of Louisiana believed that 
Teague tied its hands from ending the affliction of the 
unconstitutional penalty against Montgomery.31 This decision ignored 
the fact that evidence strongly suggests that Montgomery “has been 
rehabilitated” after spending more than fifty years in prison.32 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Supreme Court Jurisprudence Concerning Juveniles 
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment “flows from the basic ‘precept of justice that punishment 
for crime should be graduated and proportioned’ to both the offender 
and the offense.”33 The concept of cruel and unusual punishment is 
“not static.”34 Rather, it must “draw its meaning from the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”35 
As a result, courts conform their analyses to “currently prevail[ing] 
standards of whether a punishment is ‘excessive’ or ‘cruel and 
unusual.’”36 
Like these standards of decency, scientific research and knowledge 
of adolescent development is similarly evolving and deepening. That 
knowledge has informed the prevailing standards of what constitutes 
cruel and unusual punishment against juveniles, which has in turn 
informed the Supreme Court’s understanding of the Eighth 
Amendment’s application to juveniles.37 The Court articulated that 
understanding most recently in Miller v. Alabama, when it invalidated 
a state law requiring LWOP for juveniles convicted of murder.38 The 
Court’s decision in Miller was a logical progression from Graham v. 
Florida, which held as unconstitutional LWOP sentences for non-
homicide juvenile offenses.39 Graham was the first decision in which 
 
 31.  See State v. Montgomery, 2013-1163 (La. 06/20/14), 141 So. 3d 264. 
 32.  Id. at 5 (“Even without hope of release, he has served as a coach and trainer for a 
boxing team he helped establish, has worked in the prison’s silkscreen department, and strives 
to be a positive role model and counselor for other inmates.”). 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 384 (Iowa 2014). 
 37.  See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012) (“Our decisions rested not only on 
common sense—on what ‘any parent knows’—but on science and social science as well.”). 
 38.  Id. at 2475. 
 39.  See id. at 2458. 
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the Court imposed a categorical ban on the use of a term of 
imprisonment.40 The Court in Miller described LWOP as “akin to the 
death penalty” when imposed on a juvenile, given that he will likely 
spend the vast majority of his life behind bars.41 The Court in Graham 
did not ban LWOP for all juvenile offenders, as it did with capital 
punishment in Roper v. Simmons, but it did require that sentencers 
reserve it for crimes of homicide, given that it is the law’s second most 
“severe punishment.”42 
Together, the Graham, Roper, and Miller decisions reflect the 
Court’s view that children are “less deserving of the most severe 
punishments” than adults because they are still in the process of 
developing the cognitive and emotional maturity expected of law-
abiding adults.43 In all three cases, the Court cited extensive scientific 
research illustrating juveniles’ heightened susceptibility to 
psychological damage, peer pressure, “transient rashness, proclivity 
for risk, and inability to assess consequences.”44 Furthermore, the 
Court found many children were confined to the “family and home 
environment that surrounds [them]—and from which [they] cannot 
usually extricate [themselves]—no matter how brutal or 
dysfunctional.”45 Also, children are often ill-equipped to deal with the 
adult criminal justice system, including police officers, which can 
adversely contribute to their convictions.46 All of these characteristics 
lessen children’s “moral culpability” and indicate that as they 
continue to neurologically develop, they will desist in their unlawful 
behavior without outside intervention.47 When judges are allowed to 
exercise discretion in the juvenile sentencing process, they are able to 
fashion a penalty that encourages rehabilitation, as children are “less 
fixed” in their behavior than adults and their “actions are less likely to 
be ‘evidence of irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].’”48 
The Miller Court condemned mandatory life without parole 
sentences for juveniles by stating that: 
 
 
 40.  See id. 
 41.  Id. at 2466. 
 42.  Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 72 (2010). 
 43.  Id. at 50. 
 44.  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012). 
 45.  Id. at 2468. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  See id. at 2465. 
 48.  Id. at 2458. 
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Such mandatory penalties, by their nature, preclude a sentencer 
from taking account of an offender’s age and the wealth of 
characteristics and circumstances attendant to it. Under these 
schemes, every juvenile will receive the same sentence as every 
other—the 17-year-old and the 14-year-old, the shooter and the 
accomplice, the child from a stable household and the child from a 
chaotic and abusive one. And still worse, each juvenile . . . will 
receive the same sentence as the vast majority of adults 
committing similar homicide offenses. So Graham and Roper and 
our individualized sentencing cases alike teach that in imposing a 
State’s harshest penalties, a sentencer misses too much if he treats 
every child as an adult.49 
The Court stated that this cabining of judicial discretion 
contravenes the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against 
disproportionate punishments. As the Court stated, “youth matters for 
purposes of meting out the law’s most serious punishments.”50 The 
Court pointed out that judges were still allowed to issue a LWOP 
sentence to a juvenile defendant only after “tak[ing] into account how 
children are different, and how those differences counsel against 
irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.”51 
B.  Retroactivity Under Mackey and Teague 
While Miller undoubtedly created a new constitutional rule—the 
imposition of mandatory LWOP sentence on a juvenile constitutes 
cruel and unusual punishment—a new constitutional rule must also 
be substantive, and not merely procedural, in order to apply 
retroactively.52 In other words, the roughly 2,10053 individuals serving 
mandatory LWOP sentences for crimes they committed as juveniles 
will not be entitled to resentencing hearings if the Court holds that 
Miller created a procedural rule. If, however, the Court holds that the 
Miller rule is substantive, those individuals may be entitled to such 
hearings.54 Montgomery’s outcome will therefore have substantive 
implications, but those implications have no bearing on the 
determination of the Miller rule as substantive or procedural. 
 
 49.  Id. at 2467. 
 50.  Id. at 2471. 
 51.  Id. at 2469. 
 52.  Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
 53.  Joshua Rovner, Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Overview, THE SENTENCING 
PROJECT (May 2015), http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/jj_Juvenile_Life_ 
Without_Parole.pdf. 
 54.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at 10. 
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Instead, the Court has historically relied on Justice Harlan’s 
concurring opinion in the 1971 decision Mackey v. United States to 
distinguish substantive rules from procedural rules.55 Justice Harlan in 
Mackey set an exacting standard that a new constitutional rule must 
meet before it can be deemed “substantive” and thus apply 
retroactively.56 Justice Harlan employed a stringent standard because 
he was a strong proponent of preserving the finality of criminal 
convictions.57 He believed that “at some point, the criminal process, if 
it is to function at all, must turn its attention from whether a man 
ought properly to be incarcerated to how he is to be treated once 
convicted.”58 Justice Harlan espoused the traditionally conservative 
belief that the expansion of the writ of habeas corpus, a tool that 
convicted individuals can use to challenge the legality of their 
convictions, posed a threat to finality in the criminal justice system.59 
In his view, habeas should be invoked in limited circumstances, such 
as when “attack[ing] the constitutionality of the federal . . . or state . . . 
statute under which [a convicted individual has] been convicted.”60 
Justice Harlan lamented the Court’s decision in Brown v. Allen,61 
which allowed all constitutional claims to be relitigated on habeas, 
and did not want the Court to officially sanction the then-popular 
assumption that “habeas courts should apply current constitutional 
law to habeas petitioners before them.”62 Doing so would further 
widen the floodgates that Brown had already opened: 
While men languish in jail . . . awaiting a first trial on their guilt or 
innocence, it is not easy to justify expending substantial quantities 
of the time and energies of judges, prosecutors, and defense 
lawyers litigating the validity under present law of criminal 
convictions that were perfectly free from error when made final 
continually inquiring into the current constitutional validity of 
criminal convictions . . . . No one . . . is benefited by a judgment 
providing a man shall tentatively go to jail today, but tomorrow 
 
 55.  See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692–95 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 56.  See id. 
 57.  See id. at 691. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  See id. at 685. 
 60.  Id. at 684. 
 61.  344 U.S. 443 (1953). 
 62.  Mackey, 401 U.S. at 686. 
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and every day thereafter his continued incarceration shall be 
subject to fresh litigation on issues already resolved.”63 
Justice Harlan further believed that relitigation does not produce 
accurate results, as a “state that wishes to continue enforcing its laws 
against the successful petitioner to relitigate facts buried in the 
remote past through presentation of witnesses whose memories of the 
relevant events often have dimmed.”64 In his view, the “speculative 
effect” that applying a new procedural rule may have on a preexisting 
conviction or sentence did not justify undermining the principle of 
finality in the criminal justice system.65 Thus, new procedural rules 
“merely raise the possibility that someone convicted with use of the 
invalidated procedure might have been acquitted otherwise.”66 
Justice Harlan did pronounce a crucial caveat to his general 
opposition to applying new constitutional rules on collateral review. 
He only opposed the retroactive application of new procedural due 
process rules, or “those applications of the Constitution that forbid 
the Government to utilize certain techniques or processes in 
enforcing concededly valid societal proscriptions on individual 
behavior.”67 On the other hand, he believed that new “substantive due 
process” rules that “placed certain kinds of primary, private individual 
conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to 
proscribe,” should apply retroactively.68 For example, Loving v. 
Virginia69 invalidated anti-miscegenation laws under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, while Griswold v. Connecticut70 struck down a state 
contraception ban by formulating a constitutional right to privacy.71 
New substantive due process rules like these complied with his 
traditional view of habeas, as “the writ has historically been available 
for attacking convictions on such grounds.”72 
Justice Harlan believed that a matter involving a new substantive 
due process rule “represents the clearest instance where finality 
interests should yield . . . . There is little societal interest in permitting 
 
 63.  Id. at 690–91. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 345, 352 (2004). 
 67.  Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 70.  381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 71.  Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692 n.7. 
 72.  Id. at 693. 
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the criminal process to rest at a point where it ought properly never 
to repose.”73 In the words of U.S. Solicitor Donald Verrilli, the creation 
of new substantive rules raises “a real risk that a person has been 
subjected to an unjustified punishment,” and that risk outweighs 
society’s interests in finality.74 Furthermore, applying new substantive 
rules does not entail the “adverse collateral consequences of retrial.”75 
The plurality of the Court in Teague v. Lane adopted Justice 
Harlan’s concurring opinion in Mackey,76 defining substantive rules as 
those that forbid punishment of certain primary conduct.77 The 
Court’s subsequent decision in Penry v. Lynaugh78 took the holding in 
Teague to its next logical step. Writing for the majority, Justice 
O’Connor explained that Teague articulated an erroneously narrow 
view of Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Mackey: “Although Teague 
read this exception as focusing solely on new rules according 
constitutional protection to an actor’s primary conduct, Justice Harlan 
did speak in terms of substantive categorical guarantees accorded by 
the Constitution, regardless of the procedures followed.”79 
As a result, substantive rules that have retroactive force include 
“not only rules forbidding criminal punishment of certain primary 
conduct but also rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment 
for a class of defendants because of their status or offense.”80 For 
example, a new rule that “the Eighth Amendment prohibits the 
execution of mentally retarded persons . . . regardless of the 
procedures followed,” would be substantive and therefore apply 
retroactively.81 This is because “a new rule placing a certain class of 
individuals beyond the State’s power to punish by death is analogous 
 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 13, Montgomery v. 
Louisiana, No. 14-280, (U.S. July 29, 2015) [hereinafter Brief for United States as Amicus 
Curiae]. 
 75.  Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 76.  Harlan offered  one other category of new constitutional rules that should apply 
retroactively on collateral review: procedural rules that are “implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty.” Harlan cited Gideon v. Wainwright’s formulation of a rule endowing criminal 
defendants with the right to counsel as an example of such a rule. Today, this type of rule is 
referred to as a “watershed rule,” but Gideon remains the only decision that the Court has cited 
as an example of such a rule. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 74,  at 19 
n.8. 
 77.  See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
 78.  492 U.S. 302 (1989). 
 79.  Id. at 329 
 80.  Id. at 330. 
 81.  Id. 
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to a new rule placing certain conduct beyond the State’s power to 
punish at all.”82 In both instances, the Constitution “deprives the State 
of the power to impose a certain penalty, and the finality and comity 
concerns underlying Justice Harlan’s view of retroactivity have little 
force.”83 A court’s failure to apply a new substantive rule retroactively 
poses “a significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of an act 
that the law does not make criminal or faces a punishment that the 
law cannot impose upon him [or her].”84 The need to correct an unjust 
sentence trumps any concerns about finality in that instance.85 
III.  ARGUMENTS 
A.  Louisiana’s Argument 
The Respondent State of Louisiana argues that Miller v. Alabama 
created merely a procedural rule, and not a substantive one.86 After 
all, in the Miller court’s own words, its ban on mandatory LWOP for 
juveniles did not “categorically bar a penalty for a class of offenders 
or type of crime.”87 In other words, the Miller court did not impose an 
outright ban on LWOP sentences for juveniles. A juvenile homicide 
offender therefore could still receive a discretionary LWOP sentence 
following Miller. The Miller court merely mandated “that a sentencer 
follow a certain process—considering an offender’s youth and 
attendant characteristics—before imposing” a LWOP penalty.88 
Essentially, “the defendant’s ‘category of punishment’ is life-without-
parole, and its ‘mandatory’ nature simply reflects the state’s failure to 
follow ‘a certain process’ before imposing it.”89 Therefore, according to 
Louisiana, Miller was a prototypical procedural holding under Teague 
v. Lane and its progeny, because it simply required “a new 
 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004) (quoting Davis v. United States, 417 
U.S. 333, 346 (1974)). 
 85.  See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“This, I 
believe is because it represents the clearest instance where finality interests should yield.”). 
 86.  See Brief in Opposition, supra note 13, at 19–20 (“What Miller did was regulate the 
procedure for determining the culpability of a juvenile who commits murder . . . .”). 
 87.  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2471 (2012). 
 88.  Brief in Opposition, supra note 13, at 19–20  (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 
2455, 2471 (2012)). 
 89.  Brandon Buskey & Daniel Korobkin, Elevating Substance Over Procedure: The 
Retroactivity of Miller v. Alabama Under Teague v. Lane, 18 CUNY L. REV. 21, 30 (2015). 
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procedure—a penalty phase before a sentence of life without parole is 
imposed for a crime committed by a juvenile.”90 
B.  Montgomery’s Argument 
Petitioner Montgomery and his amici, including the United States 
and the American Bar Association,91 argue that Miller created an 
inherently substantive rule that applies retroactively.92 Unlike 
respondent Louisiana, Montgomery argues that mandatory LWOP 
constitutes an entirely separate punishment from discretionary 
LWOP.93 Montgomery maintains that since Miller banned the 
imposition of mandatory LWOP on a juvenile, he is facing “a 
punishment that the law cannot impose on him.”94 Montgomery is, in 
effect, wrongfully imprisoned, so Louisiana must cure this 
unconstitutional sentence. 
Montgomery relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in Alleyne v. 
United States95 to support his characterization of mandatory LWOP as 
“substantively distinct and harsher than” discretionary life without 
parole sentences.96 In Alleyne, the Court stated that “[m]andatory 
minimum sentences increase the penalty for a crime.”97 It follows 
logically that the “legally prescribed range is the penalty affixed to the 
crime.”98 Accordingly, it is “impossible to dissociate the floor of a 
sentencing range from the penalty affixed to the crime,” as 
“[e]levating the low-end of a sentencing range heightens the loss of 
liberty associated with the crime.”99 Stated differently, “substantive 
rules are those that reshape permissible outcomes.”100 By invalidating 
 
 90.  Erwin Chemerinsky, Juvenile Life-Without-Parole Case Means Courts Must Look at 
Mandatory Sentences, ABA JOURNAL (Aug. 8, 2015), http://www.abajournal.com/news/ 
article/chemerinsky_juvenile_life-without parole_case_means_courts_must_look_at_sen/. 
 91.  See Brief for Am. Bar Ass’n. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 8, 
Montgomery v. Louisiana, No. 14-280, (S. Ct. July 29, 2015); Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae, supra note 74, at 8. 
 92.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at 13–15. 
 93.  See id. at 10 (treating discretionary LWOP and mandatory LWOP differently in 
discussion). 
 94.  Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004) (citing Bousley v. United States, 523 
U.S. 614, 620 (1998)). 
 95.  133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013). 
 96.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at 16. 
 97.  Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2155 (2013). 
 98.  Id. at 2160. 
 99.  Id. at 2160–61. 
 100.  Brief of the Equal Justice Initiative on Behalf of Dozens Sentenced to Die in Prison 
When They Were Children as Amicus Curiae in support of Petitioner at 11, Montgomery v. 
Louisiana, No. 14-280 (S. Ct. July 29, 2015). 
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statutes that resulted in life without parole as the sole permissible 
outcome in the sentencing of a juvenile, Montgomery argues that the 
Miller rule reshaped permissible outcomes.101 Thus, to Montgomery, a 
“mandatory life without parole sentence . . . is substantively different 
from [a discretionary life without parole sentence]; it is harsher, more 
aggravated, and imposes a heightened loss of liberty.”102 
Montgomery also finds Supreme Court capital punishment 
jurisprudence to be supportive of his position that Miller is 
substantive. In Woodson v. North Carolina, the Court struck down a 
mandatory death penalty statute, holding that “fundamental respect 
for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment . . . requires 
consideration of the character and record of the individual offender 
and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally 
indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.”103 
Two years later, in Lockett v. Ohio,104 the Court made a critical 
distinction “between the substantive right to individualized 
sentencing that is required under the Eighth Amendment and the 
specific procedures states adopt in implementing such individualized,” 
discretionary sentencing schemes.105 The court said: 
There is no perfect procedure for deciding in which cases 
governmental authority should be used to impose death. But a 
statute that prevents the sentencer in all capital cases from giving 
independent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant’s 
character and record and to circumstances of the offense . . . 
creates the risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of 
factors which may call for a less severe penalty.106 
Essentially, while states may utilize different procedures in 
deciding which cases merit the death penalty, it is “‘constitutionally 
indispensable”107 and “essential” that sentencers be afforded 
discretion in their decision-making.108 
 
 
 101.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at 17 (“Miller requires that juveniles be 
afforded an expanded range of sentencing options by prohibiting mandatory life without parole 
punishments.”). 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304–05 (1976). 
 104.  438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
 105.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at 20. 
 106.  Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978). 
 107.  Id. at 601 (quoting Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304). 
 108.  Id. at 605. 
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Miller relied on Woodson and its progeny because LWOP 
sentences for juveniles are “akin to the death penalty.”109 Both LWOP 
and capital punishment result in the convicted individual’s death 
while in custody of the state. By implication, then, Miller’s 
requirement “of individualized sentencing for youth facing life 
without parole is, as in the death penalty cases, ‘constitutionally 
indispensable’ and ‘essential.’”110 Also, as in the context of capital 
punishment, there is an impermissible risk that a juvenile convicted 
under a mandatory LWOP scheme is sentenced to “a punishment that 
the law cannot impose on him.”111 In Justice Harlan’s opinion, this 
very scenario of a person being “subjected to an unjustified 
punishment” requires the principle of finality to yield to greater 
concerns of justice.112 
Montgomery also favorably compares Schriro v. Summerlin,113 
another Supreme Court case concerning capital punishment that 
distinguishes between substantive and procedural rules.114 The Court 
in Summerlin set out to determine whether its previous holding—that 
a jury, not a judge, was required to find an aggravating circumstance 
necessary for imposition of the death penalty—was substantive or 
procedural.115 The Court held that it was procedural, because it 
regulated “only the manner of determining the defendant’s 
culpability.”116 Such procedural rules do not merit retroactive 
application because they “merely raise the possibility that someone 
convicted with use of the invalidated procedure might have been 
acquitted otherwise.”117 By contrast, decisions that the Supreme Court 
has classified as substantive have altered the range of potential 
outcomes of the criminal process.118 Miller in no way regulates the 
 
 109.  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2466 (2012). 
 110.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at 21 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 
280, 304 (1976); Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605). 
 111.  Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004) (quoting Davis v. United States, 417 
U.S. 333, 346 (1974)). 
 112.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at 13 (“[S]ubstantive rules that expand the 
available sentences raise a real risk that a person has been subjected to an unjustified 
punishment—a situation serious enough to justify reopening final cases.”); Mackey v. United 
States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“This, I believe is because it represents 
the clearest instance where finality interests should yield.”). 
 113.  542 U.S. 348 (2004). 
 114.  Id. at 353. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. at 352. 
 118.  See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005) (narrowing the range of 
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“manner of determining the defendant’s culpability.”119 Instead, by 
giving defendants like Montgomery the chance to obtain a more 
favorable outcome than was possible before Miller, Miller alters the 
“range of permissible [sentencing] outcomes of the criminal 
proceeding” and is therefore substantive.120 The Court in Summerlin 
further stated that if a court held that “a certain fact [was] essential to 
the death penalty,” that holding would be substantive.121 Montgomery 
analogizes such a holding to Miller’s holding that prescribes a 
sentencer to consider certain enumerated factors, such as the juvenile 
defendant’s capacity for rehabilitation and his home environment, 
before imposing LWOP.122 Montgomery finds both holdings 
sufficiently similar to one another, meaning that both must be 
substantive.123 
Finally, the Montgomery has mentioned another compelling 
reason why the Court should apply Miller retroactively: it already has. 
The Court in Miller granted resentencing hearings as relief to two 
juveniles serving mandatory LWOP—the petitioner Evan Miller, and 
Kuntrell Jackson, the petitioner in Miller’s companion case.124 Miller’s 
case was on direct review, while Jackson’s case was on collateral 
review.125 Per Teague, “once a new rule is applied to the defendant in 
the case announcing the rule, evenhanded justice requires that it be 
applied retroactively to all who are similarly situated.”126 Montgomery 
is similarly situated to Jackson, as his case is also on collateral 
 
possible outcomes by eliminating capital punishment for juveniles); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 
48, 82 (2010) (narrowing the range of possible outcomes by eliminating LWOP sentences for 
non-homicide juvenile offenders). 
 119.  Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 353. 
 120.  See Government’s Response to Petitioner’s Application for Authorization to File a 
Second or Successive Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 at 13, Johnson v. United States, 720 F.3d 
720 (8th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-3744) [hereinafter Government’s Response to Petitioner’s 
Application]. 
 121.  Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 354. 
 122.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at 22–23 (outlining Miller’s requirements and 
comparing them to court precedent about aggravating factors in capital cases, and describing the 
substantive nature of each). 
 123.  See id. at 22–23. 
 124.  See id. at 15 n.7 (“Because the new rule announced in Miller was applied to Mr. 
Jackson on collateral review, Mr. Montgomery should likewise benefit from this Court’s ruling 
in Miller.”). 
 125.  See id. (“This Court’s decision in Miller provided immediate relief to two juveniles, 
Evan Miller, petitioner in Miller, and Kuntrell Jackson, the petitioner in Miller’s companion 
case, Jackson v. Hobbs, whose case was on collateral review.”). 
 126.  Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 300 (1989). 
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review.127 Because Jackson’s case benefited from the Miller rule on 
collateral review, “evenhanded justice” requires that Miller apply 
retroactively to Montgomery’s case.128 
IV. ANALYSIS: MILLER APPLIES RETROACTIVELY ON COLLATERAL 
REVIEW 
The Supreme Court should characterize the Miller v. Alabama rule 
as substantive and apply it retroactively to Montgomery’s case. A 
decision otherwise would signal that vague and unsubstantiated 
concerns about finality trump Montgomery’s essential constitutional 
rights. And, at a more basic level, such a decision would defy common 
sense. When the Supreme Court deems a punishment 
unconstitutional, the simple assumption is that the continued 
infliction of it is also unconstitutional. For example, if the Supreme 
Court definitively ruled that torture was unconstitutional, should 
society continue to torture people just because it had already begun 
to do so before the Court outlawed torture? In law, the simple 
assumption is not always the correct one. In this case, however, ample 
precedent supports the common-sense assumption. 
It is true that the language the Court used in Miller—describing 
the rule as simply a requirement “that a sentencer follow a certain 
process”129—did not do Montgomery any favors before imposing a 
particular sentence. In using a word closely related to “procedure,” 
the Court inadvertently left a red herring that has misled Lousiana. 
Lousiana’s argument is myopic and formalistic in focusing on the 
procedural aspects of the Miller rule while neglecting the substantive 
aspects. Indeed, as the United States government has noted, “nothing 
in Miller implies that the Court viewed its decision as purely 
procedural—and its holding makes clear that it is not.”130 By 
mandating “that new and more favorable potential outcomes be made 
available to defendants who previously had faced only” the outcome 
of life without parole, Miller articulated an inherently substantive 
change in the law.131 
 
 
 127.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at 15 n.7. 
 128.  Teague, 489 U.S. at 300. 
 129.  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2459 (2012). 
 130.  Government’s Response to Petitioner’s Application, supra note 120, at 15. 
 131.  Id. 
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The Supreme Court of Iowa reached this conclusion in State v. 
Ragland, holding that Miller applies retroactively.132 The court in 
Ragland conceded that, broadly speaking, Miller “does mandate a new 
procedure.”133 The new procedural requirement of a sentencing 
hearing, however, “is the result of a substantive change in the law that 
prohibits mandatory life-without-parole sentencing.”134 By prohibiting 
mandatory LWOP, the Court in Miller effectively “require[d] states to 
. . . expand the range of permissible punishments for juveniles to 
always include one sentencing option that carries the possibility of 
release.”135 The Miller rule “is not akin to a procedural rule that simply 
requires admission of a class of evidence or changing the factfinder 
[sic] from judge to jury. It requires that new sentencing options be 
available,” which is a substantive requirement.136 
As Montgomery has consistently argued, this requirement has 
enormous implications for juveniles at the sentencing phase in states 
that imposed mandatory LWOP before Miller. Still, justice requires 
that Miller have enormous implications for those 2,100 individuals 
like Montgomery who were sentenced to mandatory LWOP before 
Miller as well. To “hold otherwise would allow the state to impose 
unconstitutional punishment on some persons but not others,” merely 
because individuals like Montgomery had the misfortune of being 
sentenced before Miller.137 This would be “an intolerable miscarriage 
of justice.”138 Resentencing hearings would utilize judicial resources, 
but far less than would retrials.139 States therefore have a less 
compelling interest in finality when only the sentence, and not the 
underlying conviction, is challenged.140 
Finally, Miller itself illustrates the substantive nature of its holding 
by predicting that LWOP sentences will rarely be imposed against 
 
 132.  See State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 115 (Iowa 2013) (“Miller applies 
retroactively.”). 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Buskey & Korobkin, supra note 89, at 34. 
 136.  Government’s Response to Petitioner’s Application, supra note 120, at 15. 
 137.  Hill v. Snyder, Case No. 10-14568, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12160, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 
30, 2013). 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra  note 18, at 49 (explaining that “a sentencing hearing, 
particularly for a juvenile, is more forward-looking,” than a trial and would not require 
relitigating events that ocurred far in the past). 
 140.  See Douglas A. Berman, Re-Balancing Fitness, Fairness, and Finality for Sentences, 4 
WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 151, 152 (2014) (“[T]he strongest justifications for limiting 
reconsideration of final convictions are less compelling with respect to final sentences.”). 
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juveniles. The Court stated that “given all we have said in Roper, 
Graham, and this decision about children’s diminished culpability and 
heightened capacity for change, we think appropriate occasions for 
sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be 
uncommon.”141 If fact, it is “the rare juvenile offender whose crime 
reflects irreparable corruption.”142 Montgomery is not that rare 
offender—ample available evidence indicates “his young age and 
related characteristics mitigated against a sentence of life without 
possibility of parole.”143 Montgomery of course never received an 
individualized sentencing hearing at which a sentencing judge or jury 
could consider that mitigating evidence or his capacity for 
rehabilitation.144 Had he received such a hearing, Montgomery would 
likely not be fated to die in prison. 
The same can likely be said for the majority of individuals 
currently serving LWOP for crimes they committed as children. Most 
of these individuals were sentenced under a mandatory scheme where 
the sentencer was required to issue a LWOP sentence.145 Had a 
sentencer been able to consider mitigating circumstances before 
“irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison,”146 many of those 
juveniles could have been eligible for parole. This is particularly true 
for those persons sentenced to LWOP following conviction on a 
felony murder charge. These individuals received mandatory LWOP 
for participating “in a robbery or burglary during which a co-
participant committed murder, without the knowledge or intent of the 
teen.”147A juvenile is typically less culpable in the felony-murder 
scenario than in a traditional homicide, so a LWOP sentence seems 
particularly outsized in the felony-murder context.148 
 
 141.  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012). 
 142.  Id. (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573). 
 143.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at 5–7 (describing Montgomery’s difficult 
upbringing, low IQ, and lack of counsel when his confession was allegedly coerced). 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Ashley Nellis, The Lives of Juvenile Lifers: Findings from a National Survey, THE 
SENTENCING PROJECT (March 2012), http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/ 
jj_The_Lives_of_Juvenile_Lifers.pdf. 
 146.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. 
 147.  Alison Parker, The Rest of Their Lives: Life Without Parole for Child Offenders in the 
U.S., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 1–2 (2005), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/us1005/ 
TheRestofTheirLives.pdf. 
 148.  See id. at 27 (“[F]elony murder . . . is . . . imposed . . . on teens who participated in a 
felony such as robbery during which another participant in the crime killed someone without the 
child offender having intended the murder to occur and sometimes without even knowing the 
other participant was armed.”). 
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After Miller, it is harder than ever to justify that Montgomery and 
2,100 similarly situated individuals have been condemned to die in 
prison, and will never have the opportunity to put forth evidence of 
mitigation or rehabilitation. It is even harder to justify this reality 
when all future juvenile offenders will not have this misfortune. 
Justice Harlan developed the substantive rule exception precisely to 
prevent against the “real risk that a person has been subjected to an 
unjustified punishment.”149 By applying Miller retroactively, the Court 
would put an end to the infliction of many of these unjustified 
punishments. Until then, the law will continue to “rest at a point 
where it ought properly never to repose.”150 
CONCLUSION 
Those who support applying Miller v. Alabama retroactively take 
heart in the fact that this is the second time the Court has granted 
certiorari on a case concerned with the retroactivity of Miller.151  Many 
predict that Kennedy will cast the deciding vote.152 Whichever way the 
Court rules, it will likely have implications for questions beyond the 
scope of this case, including the constitutionality of the felony-murder 
rule, the imposition of discretionary LWOP on juveniles, and the 
wisdom of trying youth as adults.153 At the very least, it will bring 
greatly needed clarity to the Teague v. Lane doctrine. 
 
 
 149.  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 74, at 6. 
 150.  Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 151.  Telephone Interview with Lauren Fine, Co-Founder and Co-Director at the Youth 
Sentencing & Reentry Project (Sept. 9, 2015). 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Id. 
